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Abstract
We present a unifying semantic and proof-theoretical framework for investigating depth-bounded approx-
imations to Boolean Logic in which the number of nested applications of a single structural rule, repre-
senting the classical Principle of Bivalence (classical cut), is bounded above by a ﬁxed natural number.
These approximations provide a hierarchy of tractable logical systems that indeﬁnitely converge to classical
propositional logic. The operational rules are shared by all approximation systems and are justiﬁed by
an “informational semantics” whereby the meaning of a logical operator is speciﬁed solely in terms of the
information that is actually possessed by an agent.
Keywords: Classical Propositional Logic, Informational Semantics, Non-deterministic matrices,
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1 Introduction
According to the received view, classical logic is informationally trivial : the informa-
tion carried by its conclusion is included in the information carried by its premises.
This intuitively clashes with the known results that ﬁrst-order logic is undecidable
and classical propositional logic is NP -hard. The fundamental question is:
do we actually possess the information that the conclusion of an inference
is true whenever we possess the information that its premises are true?
(1)
The lack of a general decision procedure strongly suggests that the intuitive answer
is “no” in the domain of classical ﬁrst-order logic: there is no guarantee that we are
in a position to recognize the truth of a valid consequence A of a set Γ of sentences
1 This paper elaborates on ideas and results stemming from my collaboration with Marcelo Finger, Luciano
Floridi and Dov Gabbay. I wish to thank Maribel Fernandez and Marcelo Finger for inviting me to present
this work at LSFA2013 and all the participants for the stimulating discussion.
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in all situations in which we recognize the truth of the sentences in Γ. Moreover,
despite the existence of decision procedures for classical propositional logic, the
widely believed conjecture that P = NP , makes it highly improbable that there
exists a feasible one. Therefore, if we construe the notion of “actually possessing” a
piece of information as having access to it in practice, and not only in principle, a
positive answer to (1) sounds highly counterintuitive even in the restricted domain
of propositional logic. Hence, there is a tension between the received view that logic
is informationally trivial and the intuitive, commonsense, interpretation of this view
underlying the simple question raised in (1).
In this contribution, we elaborate on ideas and results presented in a series of
previous papers [16,21,17,20,18,19], to address the following problem: for which
subsystems of classical propositional logic does it make intuitive sense to give a
positive answer to (1)? As argued in [20,19], a rather natural solution stems from
an alternative way of characterizing the meaning of the Boolean operators, that we
call informational semantics, whereby the meaning of a logical operator is speciﬁed
solely in terms of the information that is actually possessed by an agent. This seman-
tics leads to a hierarchy of tractable logical systems that indeﬁnitely approximate
classical propositional logic. The informational meaning of the logical operators is
the same for all approximations and is captured by an intuitive semantics based
on non-deterministic matrices or, equivalently, on a set of natural introduction and
elimination rules for the logical operators. The increasing inferential power of each
approximation depends only on a single structural rule and on the depth at which
its application is allowed. This structural rule is, in essence, a classical cut rule —
closely related to the classical Principle of Bivalence — that governs the manipula-
tion of “virtual information”, i.e., information that we do not actually possess, but
we temporarily assume as if we possessed it. 3 Suppose that our current informa-
tion state includes the information that A ∨ B and ¬A ∨ B are both true, but no
information about A and B. However, our (metaphysical) notion of truth implies
that A is either true or false. Then, we can conclude that, in either case, the infor-
mation that B is true belongs to any virtual extension of our current information
state that includes deﬁnite information about A:
If we were informed that A is true, then we would be informed that
B is true
If we were informed that A is false, then we would be informed
that B is true
We are informed that B is true
But neither of the two pieces of information concerning A is actually included in
our current information state. This is why we call this “virtual information”. A
reasoning agent (whether human or artiﬁcial) that actually possesses the informa-
3 Logicians are familiar with virtual information from the so-called “discharge rules” of natural deduction
systems. However, in Gentzen-style natural deduction the use of virtual information is essential in some of
the inference rules that ﬁx the (classical or intuitionistic) meaning of the logical operators. In our approach,
on the other hand, virtual information plays no role in the explication of their informational meaning and
its use is governed by a single structural rule (see Section 4 below).
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tion that A∨B and ¬A∨B are both true, does not thereby possess the information
that B is true, unless it is able to simulate virtual information states that are richer
than its current one. This is a non-trivial step both from the computational and
the cognitive viewpoint and the depth at which the iterated use of such virtual
information is required may be an interesting measure of the computational and
cognitive eﬀort involved in extracting the information that is implicitly contained
in the premises.
The approximation of depth 0 is the one in which no use of virtual information is
allowed and valid inferences are those that can be justiﬁed directly by the informa-
tional semantics for the logical operators. This basic system enjoys the subformula
property and admits of a simple polynomial time decision procedure. A k-depth
approximation is obtained when at most k nested applications of the structural rule
for virtual information are allowed. 4 Each k-depth system enjoys the subformula
property and admits of a polynomial time decision procedure whose complexity
increases with k.
In our approach, therefore, the answer to (1) is amatter of degree and depends on
the minimum depth at which the conclusion can be deduced from the premises. We
maintain that this “incremental” view of classical propositional logic, which takes
it as the limit of a sequence of tractable subsystems of increasing inferential power
(and increasing computational complexity), can be useful in a variety of computing
applications as well as in all research areas that require a non-idealized approach to
the inferential power of human or artiﬁcial reasoning systems.
2 Informational meaning of the Boolean operators
The classical meaning of the logical operators is usually speciﬁed by the familiar
truth-tables that ﬁx the conditions under which a sentence is true or false in terms
of the truth or falsity of its immediate constituents. The underlying notions of
truth and falsity are assumed to obey the two classical principles of Bivalence (any
sentence is either true or false independent of our holding any information about it)
and Non-Contradiction (no sentence can be at the same time true and false). This
way of ﬁxing the meaning of a logical operator is perfectly in tune with the classical,
information-transcendent, notions of truth and falsity and with the traditional view
of logical inference as a truth-transmission device; but it is at odds with the equally
widespread view of logical inference as an information-processing device. To abide
by the latter view we need a semantics based on informational notions. In particular,
in order to deﬁne subsystems of classical logic that justify a positive answer to (1),
we need a semantics based on the notion of actual information, i.e., to put it with
Jaakko Hintikka, information that “we actually possess (as distinguished from the
information we in some sense have potentially available to us) and with which we
4 This hierarchy can be interestingly compared to similar hierarchies based on diﬀerent semantic and proof-
theoretical characterizations, as the ones proposed in [9,25,26,13,38,28,29,31,32,30]. The proof-theoretical
characterization is closely related to St˚almarck’s method [38]; for a more detailed discussion of this relation
see [20]. We stress that such hierarchies cannot be naturally obtained from Gentzen-style characterizations
of classical logic.
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can in fact operate” [33, p. 229].
The primary notions of this semantics are not truth and falsity, but informational
truth and informational falsity, namely holding the information that a sentence is
true, respectively false. Here, by saying that an agent x holds the information that
A is true (respectively false) we mean that this is information that is practically
available to x and with which x can operate. 5 Unlike classical truth and falsity
however, these informational notions do not satisfy the informational version of
the Principle of Bivalence: it may well be that for a given A, we neither hold the
information that A is true, nor do we hold the information that A is false. In this
paper we assume that they satisfy the informational version of the Principle of Non-
Contradiction: no agent can actually possess both the information that A is true
and the information that A is false, as this would be deemed to be equivalent to
possessing no deﬁnite information about A. 6 We may use the values 1 and 0 to
denote, respectively, informational truth and falsity. When a sentence takes neither
of these two deﬁned values, we say that it is informationally indeterminate. It is
technically convenient to treat informational indeterminacy as a third value that
we denote by “⊥”. 7 The three values are partially ordered by the relation  such
that v  w (“v is less deﬁned than, or equal to, w”) if, and only if, v = ⊥ or v = w
for v, w ∈ {0, 1,⊥}.
Note that the old familiar truth tables for ∧,∨ and ¬ are still intuitively sound
under this informational reinterpretation of 1 and 0. 8 However, they are no longer
exhaustive: they do not tell us what happens when one or all of the immediate
constituents of a complex sentence are assigned the value ⊥.
So, we only need to conservatively extend the classical truth-tables with new
entries to accommodate the third value ⊥. More precisely, for every n-ary Boolean
operator , whose classical meaning is ﬁxed by a truth-function f, we want to
specify its informational meaning as given by some sort of function fˆ satisfying:
fˆ(z1, . . . , zn) = f(z1, . . . , zn), whenever z1, . . . , zn ∈ {0, 1}. (2)
Given our interpretation of the third value ⊥ as informational indeterminacy, a rea-
sonable requirement is also that our logical operators are monotonic in the following
sense:
v1  w1 and . . . and vn  wn =⇒ fˆ(v1, . . . , vn)  fˆ(w1, . . . , wn) (3)
Let us, from now on, restrict our attention to the logical operators ∧,∨,¬. Under
5 We do not need to engage in a discussion about what “true” and “false” may mean in a given application
context, but just to assume that these two words “true” and “false” have been given a deﬁnite meaning
(which may well be the classical one) that obeys the principles of Bivalence and Non-Contradiction.
6 It is, of course, possible to investigate variants of the semantics proposed in this paper in which this
informational version of the Principle of Non-Contradiction is relaxed.
7 This is the symbol for “undeﬁned”, the bottom element of the information ordering, not to be confused
with the “falsum” logical constant.
8 For example, if we hold the information that A is true and the information that B is true, then we thereby
hold the information that A ∧ B is true. If we hold the information that A is true or the information that
B is true, we thereby hold the information that A ∨B is true, etc.
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∧ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 0 ⊥
0 0 0 0
⊥ ⊥ 0 ⊥
∨ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 ⊥
⊥ 1 ⊥ ⊥
¬
1 0
0 1
⊥ ⊥
Table 1
Kleene’s 3-valued matrices.
the requirements (2) and (3), the matrices of Kleene’s (strong) 3-valued logic [34,
§64], shown in Table 1, may appear as the most natural candidates to represent their
informational meaning. However, while the matrix for negation appears perfectly
in tune with our informational interpretation of the three values, the matrices for
∧ and ∨ are not, in that they clash with some of our intuitive judgments. This
intuitive counterevidence is well expressed in the following quotations from Willard
V.O. Quine taken from his book The Roots of Reference and concerning what he
there calls “the primitive meaning of the logical operators”:
Conjunction has its blind spot [...] when neither component commands assent or
dissent. There is no direct way of mastering this quarter. In some such cases the
conjunction commands dissent and in others it commands nothing. This sector
is mastered only later, in theory-laden ways. Where the components are “it is a
mouse” and “it is a chipmunk”, and neither is aﬃrmed nor denied, the conjunc-
tion will still be denied. But where the components are “it is a mouse” and “it is
in the kitchen”, and neither is aﬃrmed nor denied, the conjunction will perhaps
be left in abeyance.
[...]
Alternation, like conjunction, has its blind quarter where neither component com-
mands assent or dissent. We might assent to the alternation of “it is a mouse”
and “it is chipmunk” or we might abstain. 9
In general, when we are faced with a conjunction A ∧ B in which both A and
B are informationally indeterminate, the value of the conjunction may be either
informational falsity 0, or informational indeterminacy ⊥, depending on whether or
not we hold the information that A and B cannot be simultaneously true. And the
value of A∨B may be either informational truth 1 or informational indeterminacy
⊥, depending on whether or not we hold the information that at least one of A and
B must be true. For example, when I suﬀer from fuzzy vision, I may well hold the
information that the the digit at which the optician is pointing is either a 5 or a
7 as well as the information that it is not both a 5 and a 7, although the sentences
“it is a 5” and “it is a 7” are both informationally indeterminate.
As far as the operator ∨ is concerned, its informational meaning we are trying
to characterize clearly departs from its intuitionistic meaning, according to which
9 [36, p. 77].
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a disjunction A ∨ B is intuitionistically true (roughly speaking, provable 10 ) if and
only if either A is intuitionistically true or B is intuitionistically true. This is
the so-called disjunction property of intuitionistic logic. While this property is
appropriate for (constructive) mathematics, it is quite at odds with ordinary usage
outside mathematics. As Michael Dummett puts it:
I may be entitled to assert “A or B” because I was reliably so informed by someone
in a position to know, but if he did not choose to tell me which alternative held
good, I could not apply an or-introduction rule to arrive at that conclusion. [. . . ]
Hardy may simply not have been able to hear whether Nelson said “Kismet hardy”
or “Kiss me Hardy”, though he heard him say one or the other: once we have the
concept of disjunction, our perceptions themselves may assume an irremediably
disjunctive form. 11
Indeed, this appears to be a distinctive feature of the down-to-earth kind of infor-
mation with which we practically operate in most non-mathematical contexts:
Unlike mathematical information, empirical information decays at two stages: in
the process of acquisition, and in the course of retention and transmission. An
attendant directing theatre-goers to diﬀerent entrances according to the colours
of their tickets might even register that a ticket was yellow or green, without
registering which it was, if holders of tickets of either colours were to use the
same entrance; even our observations are incomplete, in the sense that we do not
and cannot take in every detail of what is in our sensory ﬁelds. That informa-
tion decays yet further in memory and in the process of being communicated is
evident. In mathematics, any eﬀective procedure remains eternally available to
be executed; in the world of our experience, the opportunity for inspection and
veriﬁcation is ﬂeeting. 12
This discussion strongly suggests that Kleene’s 3-valued matrices are not apt to
capture the informational meaning of the logical operators ∨ and ∧ and that, indeed,
no system of standard deterministic matrices can do any better. Quine’s suggestion,
reported in the above quotations, leads to the following non-deterministic matrices
for ∧ and ∨:
∧ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 0 ⊥
0 0 0 0
⊥ ⊥ 0 ⊥, 0
∨ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 ⊥
⊥ 1 ⊥ ⊥, 1
Here, the entries in which both arguments are ⊥ yield two alternative possible val-
ues, meaning that the value of the compound sentence is not uniquely determined
by the values of its immediate constituents, but can be either of the two values
10This is somewhat of a simpliﬁcation. For a more accurate discussion of intuitionistic truth, see [37].
11 [27], pp. 266–267, my emphasis.
12 [27], pp. 277–278.
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¬
1 0
0 1
⊥ ⊥
∧ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 0 ⊥
0 0 0 0
⊥ ⊥ 0 ⊥, 0
∨ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 ⊥
⊥ 1 ⊥ ⊥, 1
→ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 0 ⊥
0 1 1 1
⊥ 1 ⊥ ⊥, 1
Table 2
Informational 3-valued matrices for the Boolean operators.
shown. In other words, the “function” fˆ that ﬁxes the informational meaning of a
binary operator  is a non-deterministic truth-function. 13 These non-deterministic
matrices where independently rediscovered by Crawford and Etherington [13] and
used to provide a semantic characterization of unit-resolution. The general the-
ory of non-deterministic matrices has been brought to the attention of the logical
community and extensively investigated by Arnon Avron (see [3,4,1,5,2,6] among
others).
A non-deterministic matrix for the informational meaning of the Boolean con-
ditional can be obtained in the obvious way. The informational 3-valued matrices
for the four Boolean operators are recapitulated in Table 2.
3 The 0-depth logic
We start by characterizing the 0-depth logic whose inferences are justiﬁed by the
only means of the informational meaning of the logical operators and no use of
virtual information is allowed. Let F be the set of all Boolean formulae.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A 3ND-valuation is a mapping V : F → {0, 1,⊥}, satisfying the
following conditions for all A,B ∈ F :
(i) V (¬A) = fˆ¬(V (A))
(ii) V (A ◦B) ∈ fˆ◦(V (A), V (B))
where ◦ is ∧, ∨ or →, fˆ¬ is the deterministic truth-function deﬁned by the informa-
tional 3-valued matrix for ¬, and fˆ◦ is the non-deterministic truth-function deﬁned
by the informational 3-valued matrix for ◦.
A 3ND-valuation can be seen as describing an information state that is closed
under the implicit information that stems from the informational meaning of the
logical operators. The claim is that such an information state contains information
that we actually possess and with which we can operate, in the precise sense that we
have a feasible procedure to decide, for every formula A, whether the information
that A is true, or the information that A is false, or neither of them actually belongs
to our information state. This claim will be substantiated in Proposition 3.8 below,
by showing that all the implicit information that stems from the informational
13This is just convenient jargon for a function V n → 2V \ ∅, with V the set of truth-values.
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meaning of the logical operators can be feasibly recognized. 14
In what follows we shall make use of signed formulae (S-formulae for short),
namely expressions of the form T A or F A with the intended meaning of “A is
informationally true” and “A is informationally false”. This choice allows us to
express a 3ND-valuation V as a set of S-formulae, namely the set {T A | V (A) = 1}∪
{F A | V (A) = 0}. We shall use “ϕ, ψ, θ, . . .”, as variables ranging over S-formulae
and “A,B,C, . . .” as variables ranging over usual unsigned formulae. We shall also
use “X,Y, Z,. . . ”, as variables ranging over sets of S-formulae and “Γ,Δ,Λ, . . .”, as
variables ranging over sets of unsigned formulae.
Let us say that a 3ND-valuation V satisﬁes an S-formula T A if V (A) = 1 and
an S-formula F A if V (A) = 0.
Deﬁnitions 3.2 For every set X of S-formulae and every S-formula ϕ, we say
that:
• ϕ is a 0-depth consequence of X if V satisﬁes ϕ for every 3ND-valuation V such
that V satisﬁes all the S-formulae in X.
• X is 0-depth inconsistent if there is no 3ND-valuation V such that V satisﬁes all
the S-formulae in X.
We use the symbol “0” for the 0-depth consequence relation and write “X 0 ϕ”
for “ϕ is a 0-depth consequence of X”. The notions of 0-depth consequence and
0-depth inconsistency can be extended to unsigned formulae by stipulating that an
unsigned formula A is a 0-depth consequence of a set Γ of unsigned formulae if
and only if T Γ 0 T A and that Γ is 0-depth inconsistent if and only if T Γ is 0-
depth inconsistent. In [20] (Proposition 2.49) it is shown that 0-depth consequence
and 0-depth inconsistency cannot be characterized by any set of ﬁnitely valued
deterministic matrices.
Note that, according to our deﬁnitions, as they stand, 0 is explosive just like
classical logic: when X is 0-depth inconsistent, X 0 ϕ for every ϕ, since there is
no 3ND-valuation V that satisﬁes all the formulae in X. However, 0-depth incon-
sistency is stricter than classical inconsistency — a set X of S-formulae may well
be 0-depth consistent but classically inconsistent — and, more importantly, can be
feasibly detected (see Proposition 3.8 below and the following comment).
It is not diﬃcult to show that he relation 0 is a Tarskian consequence rela-
tion, that is, it satisﬁes reﬂexivity, monotonicity and cut. We remark that 0, like
Kleene’s 3-valued logic [34, §64] and Belnap’s 4-valued logic [7,8], has no tautolo-
gies. This is not so surprising if one thinks that a tautology is usually described as
“a consequence of the empty set of premises”. Since the 0-depth logic is the logic
that uses no virtual information, there is no way of extracting information from
the empty information state without simulating possible non-empty extensions of
it. Accordingly, tautologies make their appearance only at depth > 0, when virtual
information is introduced, and the set of provable tautologies increases with the
depth at which its use is allowed.
14Clearly this is not the case of the implicit information that stems from their classical meaning.
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A natural proof-theoretical characterization of the 0-depth consequence relation
0 is obtained by means of a set of introduction and elimination rules (intelim rules)
for the logical operators. These rules are shown in Tables 3 and 4 and are expressed
in terms of S-formulae. A version of these rules for unsigned formulae is obtained
by removing all the occurrences of the sign T and replacing all the occurrences of
the sign F with the negation sign ¬.
Deﬁnitions 3.3 Given a set X of S-formulae:
• An intelim sequence for X is a sequence ϕ1, . . . ϕn of S-formulae such that, for
every i = 0, . . . , n, either ϕi ∈ X or is the conclusion of the application of an
intelim rule to preceding formulae.
• An intelim sequence is closed when it contains both T A and F A for some A.
• An intelim refutation of X is a closed intelim sequence for X.
• A intelim proof of ϕ from X is an intelim sequence for X such that ϕ is the last
S-formula in the sequence.
• X is intelim-refutable if there is a closed intelim sequence for X.
• An S-formula ϕ is intelim deducible from X if there is an intelim proof of ϕ from
X.
We use the symbol “0” to denote the relation of intelim-deducibility and write
“X 0 ϕ” for “ϕ is a 0-depth deducible from X”.
Again, we can extend the notions of intelim deducibility and refutability to
unsigned formulae by stipulating that an unsigned formula A is intelim deducible
from a set Γ of unsigned formulae if T A is intelim deducible from T Γ and that a
set Γ of unsigned formulae is intelim refutable if T Γ is intelim refutable.
Before showing that 0 and 0 are co-extensional we show that 0 is explosive
like its semantic counterpart 0 (and like classical logic).
Proposition 3.4 If X is intelim refutable, than X 0 ϕ for every ϕ.
Proof. If X is intelim refutable, then there is an intelim sequence for X that
contains both T A and F A for some A. Then, for every B: (i) an intelim proof of
T B is obtained in two steps as follows: from premise T A derive T A∨B by T∨-I1;
then from premises F A and T A ∨B derive T B by T∨-E2; 15 (ii) an intelim proof
of F B s obtained in two steps as follows: from premise F A derive F A ∧ B by
F∧-I1; then from premises T A and F A ∧B derive F B by F∧-E1. 
Proposition 3.5 For every set X of S-formulae and every S-formula ϕ,
(i) X is 0-depth inconsistent if and only if X is intelim refutable;
(ii) X 0 ϕ if and only if X 0 ϕ.
Proof (Sketch) The reader can check that the intelim rules are all sound with
respect to the informational 3-valued matrices. For example, the rule T∨-E1 can be
read oﬀ the informational 3-valued matrix for ∨, simply by noting that, whenever
15This is Lewis’s argument for ex-falso quodlibet.
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the value of the disjunction is 1 and that of one of the two disjuncts is 0, the
value of the other disjunct must be 1. As for completeness, 16 consider the set
X∗ = {ψ | X 0 ψ}. For the ﬁrst claim, suppose that X is not intelim refutable.
Then, for no formula A, T A and F A are both in X∗. Next, show that the function
V deﬁned as follows:
V (A) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if T A ∈ X∗
0 if F A ∈ X∗
⊥ otherwise
is a 3ND-valuation. Here we just outline a typical case. Suppose V (A) = V (B) = ⊥.
Then F A ∨ B ∈ X∗. Otherwise, if F A ∨ B ∈ X∗, then by deﬁnition of X∗ and
by the rules F∨-E , F A and F B should also be in X∗; therefore, by deﬁnition of
V , V (A) = V (B) = 0 against our assumption. Hence V (A ∨ B) = 0. Moreover,
T A ∨B, may or may not belong to X∗, and so V (A ∨B) = 1 or V (A ∨B) = ⊥.
Finally, observe that ψ ∈ X∗ for all ψ ∈ X and so, by deﬁnition of V , V satisﬁes
all ψ ∈ X. Hence X is 0-depth consistent. For the second claim, suppose X 0 ϕ.
Observe that, in this case, X is not intelim refutable, otherwise, by Proposition 3.4,
X 0 ϕ against the hypothesis. Moreover, ϕ ∈ X∗. So, for the 3ND-valuation V
deﬁned above, V satisﬁes all ψ ∈ X and V does not satisfy ϕ. Hence X 0 ϕ. 
The unsigned part of an S-formula is the unsigned formula that results from it
by removing the sign T or F . Given an S-formula ϕ, we denote by ϕu the unsigned
part of ϕ.
Deﬁnition 3.6 We say that an intelim proof of ϕ from X (an intelim refutation of
X) has the subformula property (SFP) if, for every S-formula ψ occurring in it, ψu
is a subformula of θu for some θ in X ∪ {ϕ} (in X).
For an intelim sequence π, let |π| denote the length of π.
Proposition 3.7 (Subformula Property)
(i) For every intelim proof π of ϕ from X:
• if π is an open intelim sequence, π can be transformed into an intelim proof
π′ of ϕ from X such that π′ has the SFP and |π′| ≤ |π|;
• if π is a closed intelim sequence, there is an intelim refutation π′ of X such
that π′ has the SFP and |π′| ≤ |π|.
(ii) For every intelim refutation π of X, π can be transformed into an intelim
refutation π′ of X such that π′ has the SFP and |π′| ≤ |π|.
A detailed proof of the above proposition can be found in [20]. The subformula
property of intelim proofs and refutations paves the way for a feasible decision
procedure for intelim deducibility and refutability. The following proposition is also
proven in [20].
16An indirect proof is given in [20] where the 0-depth consequence relation 0 is characterized in terms of
another semantics (called “modular semantics”) that is shown to be equivalent to the informational 3-valued
semantics.
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F A
T ¬A
T¬-I
T A
F ¬A
F¬-I
T A
T A ∨B
T∨-I1
T B
T A ∨B
T∨-I2
F A
F B
F A ∨B
F∨-I
F A
F A ∧B
F∧-I1
F B
F A ∧B
F∧-I2
T A
T B
T A ∧B
T∧-I
F A
T A → B
T→-I1
T B
T A → B
T→-I2
T A
F B
F A → B
F→-I
Table 3
Introduction rules for the standard Boolean operators.
Proposition 3.8 Whether or not X 0 ϕ (X is 0-depth refutable) can be decided
in time O(n2) where n is the total number of occurrences of symbols in X ∪{ϕ} (in
X).
Proposition 3.8 suggests that the explosivity of 0-depth consequence is far less
serious a problem then the explosivity of classical consequence. For, we can always
feasibly detect that our premises are 0-depth inconsistent and, therefore, we may
as well abstain from drawing bizarre conclusions on their basis. 17 Unlike hidden
classical inconsistencies, that may be hard to discover even for agents equipped with
powerful (but still bounded) computational resources, 0-depth inconsistency lies, as
it were, on the surface. So, we always have a feasible means to ensure that our
premises are 0-depth consistent, in which case the consequence relation 0 is not
explosive, even if these premises are classically inconsistent.
4 Tractable k-depth approximations to Boolean logic
As argued in the previous section, we can think of a 3ND-valuation as a most basic
kind of information state: a collection of pieces of information closed only under
the implicit information that stems from the informational meaning of the logical
17As Michael Dummett puts it: “Obviously, once a contradiction has been discovered, no one is going to
go through it: to exploit it to show that the train leaves at 11:52 or that the next Pope will be a woman.”
[27, p. 209].
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T ¬A
F A
T¬-E
F ¬A
T A
F¬-E
T A ∨B
F A
T B
T∨-E1
T A ∨B
F B
T A
T∨-E2
F A ∨B
F A
F∨-E1
F A ∨B
F B
F∨-E2
F A ∧B
T A
F B
F∧-E1
F A ∧B
T B
F A
F∧-E2
T A ∧B
T A
T∧-E1
T A ∧B
T B
T∧-E2
T A → B
T A
T B
T→-E1
T A → B
F B
F A
T→-E2
F A → B
T A
F→-E1
F A → B
F B
F→-E2
Table 4
Elimination rules for the four standard Boolean operators
operators. The 0-depth consequence relation 0 is a tractable subsystem of classical
propositional logic obtained by replacing the notion of “possible world” with this
weaker notion of information state, which makes no direct reference to the classical
information-transcendent notions of truth and falsity of classical semantics, but only
to their informational counterparts — informational truth and informational falsity
— that are taken as primary semantic notions. 18
What about the classical inferences that are not valid under this informational
semantics? For example, consider the classically valid inference A∨B,¬A∨B/B dis-
cussed in the introduction. This inference cannot be justiﬁed by virtue of the 3ND-
matrices. A counterexample is any 3ND-valuation V such that V (A) = V (B) = ⊥
and V (A ∨ B) = V (¬A ∨ B) = 1. 19 In order to validate the above inference, we
need to restrict our attention to the reﬁnements V ′ of V such that V ′(A) = ⊥. It
is easy to check that V ′(B) = 1 for every such reﬁnement of V . In other words,
we need to go beyond the information that we actually possess and simulate virtual
18The notions of informational truth and informational falsity (holding the information that a sentence
is true, respectively false) may make indirect reference to information-transcendent notions of truth and
falsity, that may well (but need not) be the classical notions, but the latter play no role in the justiﬁcation
of logical inference, since all the inference rules are based only on the informational notions. In classical
logic, on the other hand, the truth-tables entries are all sound under the informational interpretation, but
the Principle of Bivalence, which plays an essential role in justifying the validity of classical inferences, is
not.
19Recall that if V (A) = ⊥, then V (¬A) = ⊥ and that when the value of both disjuncts is ⊥, the value of
the disjunction may be either 1 or ⊥.
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information states in which we hold deﬁnite information about the truth or falsity
of A.
Given a set of formulae Γ, we use the notation Sub(Γ) to denote the set of all
subformulae of the formulae in Γ.
Deﬁnitions 4.1 For all k ∈ N+,
(i) X k ϕ if and only if X ∪ {T A} k−1 ϕ and X ∪ {F A} k−1 ϕ for some
A ∈ Sub(Xu ∪ {ϕu});
(ii) X is k-depth inconsistent if and only if X ∪ {T A} and X ∪ {F A} are both
k − 1-depth inconsistent for some A ∈ Sub(Xu).
Observe that, since 0 is monotonic, j⊆k whenever j ≤ k. The transition from
k to k+1 corresponds to an increase in the depth at which the nested use of virtual
information is allowed. It is not diﬃcult to show that:
Proposition 4.2 The relation ∞=
⋃
k∈N |=k is the consequence relation of clas-
sical propositional logic.
Given Proposition 3.5 and the deﬁnitions of k-depth consequence k and k-
depth inconsistency given above, the corresponding notions of k-depth deducibility
and k-depth refutability for k ∈ N+, are trivially deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.3 For all k ∈ N+,
(i) X k ϕ if and only if X ∪ {T A} k−1 ϕ and X ∪ {F A} k−1 ϕ for some
A ∈ Sub(Xu ∪ {ϕu});
(ii) X is k-depth refutable if and only if X ∪ {T A} and X ∪ {F A} are both
k − 1-depth refutable for some A ∈ Sub(Xu).
As before, we extend the relations k and k to unsigned formulae by stipulating
that Γ k A (Γ k A) if and only if T Γ k T A (T Γ k T A). Similarly, we stipulate
that Γ is k-depth inconsistent (k-depth refutable) if and only if T Γ is k-depth
inconsistent (k-depth refutable).
While deductions of depth 0 are represented by intelim sequences, deductions
of depth k > 0 may be aptly represented in the format of intelim trees. For this
purpose it is suﬃcient to add to the intelim rules the following branching rule: 20
T A
 
F A
PB
Each application of this rule allows us to introduce virtual information concerning
an arbitrary formula A by appending both T A and F A as sibling nodes at the end
of any branch of the tree, generating two new branches. The formula A involved in
a speciﬁc application of the rule is called PB-formula. The S-formulae T A and F A
are called virtual assumptions. Such a step invites us to consider information states
that, besides containing all the information expressed by the preceding S-formulae
20“PB” stands for “Principle of Bivalence”.
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in the branch, also contain deﬁnite information about the truth or falsity of the
PB-formula A.
Deﬁnition 4.4 An intelim tree for X is a tree T of S-formulae such that, for every
S-formula ϕ in a branch of T , either
(i) ϕ ∈ X, or
(ii) ϕ is obtained from preceding S-formulae in the same branch by an application
of an intelim rule, or
(iii) ϕ is a virtual assumption introduced by an application of the branching rule
PB.
We say that a branch of an intelim tree is closed if it contains both T A and F A
for some formula A, otherwise it is open.
Deﬁnition 4.5 The depth of an intelim tree T is the maximum number of virtual
assumptions occurring in a branch of T .
Deﬁnitions 4.6 For all k ∈ N,
(i) A k-depth intelim proof of ϕ from X is an intelim tree T for X of depth k
such that ϕ occurs in all open branches of T ;
(ii) A k-depth refutation of X is an intelim tree T for X of depth k such that every
branch of T is closed.
For each intelim tree T , let us denote by PB(T ) the set of all PB-formulae
occurring in T .
Proposition 4.7 For all k ∈ N,
(i) Every k-depth intelim proof T of ϕ from X can be transformed into a k+j-depth
(with j ≥ 0) intelim proof T ′ of ϕ from X such that PB(T ′) ⊆ Sub(Xu ∪ ϕu).
(ii) every k-depth refutation T of X can be transformed into a k + j-depth (with
j ≥ 0) T ′ of X such that PB(T ′) ⊆ Sub(Xu).
A proof of the above proposition can be adapted from [16]. Let us say that an
intelim proof T of ϕ from X (an intelim refutation T of X) has the subformula
property (SFP) if ψu ∈ Sub(Xu ∪ ϕu) (ψu ∈ Sub(Xu)) for every S-formula ψ
occurring in T . It follows from Propositions 3.7 and 4.7 that
Proposition 4.8 For all k ∈ N,
(i) Every k-depth intelim proof T of ϕ from X such that PB(T ) ⊆ Sub(Xu ∪ ϕu)
can be transformed into a k-depth intelim proof T ′ of ϕ from X such that T ′
has the SFP.
(ii) Every k-depth refutation T of X such that PB(T ) ⊆ Sub(Xu) can be trans-
formed into a k-depth refutation T ′ of X such that T ′ has the SFP.
Then, it is easy to show that:
Proposition 4.9 For all k ∈ N,
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(i) X k ϕ if and only if, for some j ≤ k, there is a j-depth intelim proof T of ϕ
from X such that T has the SFP;
(ii) X is k-depth refutable if and only if for some j ≤ k, there is a j-depth intelim
refutation T of X such that T has the SFP.
An example of an intelim proof of depth 2 with the SFP is given in Figure 1.
This is an intelim proof of T H from premises 1–6. The reader can check that
each S-formula that is not a premise either is obtained from previous S-formulae
on the same branch by an application of one of the intelim rules in Tables 3 and 4,
or is one of the virtual assumptions introduced by the branching rule PB. All the
open branches end with the S-formula T H. The rightmost branch is closed since
it contains both T C and F C. Each open branch is a 0-depth intelim proof of T H
from the union of the initial premises 1–6 plus the virtual assumptions introduced
by the rule PB on that branch. Given Propositions 3.8 and 4.9 it is not diﬃcult to
show that, for each ﬁxed k, k admits of a feasible decision procedure:
Proposition 4.10 For each k ∈ N, whether or not X k ϕ (X is k-depth refutable),
can be decided in time O(nk+2), where n is the total number of occurrences of
symbols in X ∪ {ϕ} (in X).
For unbounded k, the method of intelim trees is a proof system for full classical
propositional logic that enjoys the subformula property. 21 If unbounded applica-
tions of PB are allowed, the introduction rules become redundant, since they can be
easily derived from the elimination rules with the help of PB. The system consist-
ing only of the elimination rules plus unbounded applications of PB is a complete
system for classical propositional logic that enjoys the SFP, since the applications
of PB can be restricted to subformulae and the elimination rules obviously preserve
the SFP. This system, known as KE, was originally proposed as a refutation system
akin to Smullyan’s semantic tableaux but essentially more eﬃcient. It was shown
that KE has an exponential speed-up on semantic tableaux and on Gentzen’s cut-
free sequent calculus even if we consider its “analytic restriction” that yields only
refutations with the SFP [14,24,15]. The unbounded method of intelim trees can be
seen as an extension of KE, obtained by adding suitable introduction rules for the
logical operators that are all easily derivable from the elimination rules and PB. So,
intended as a method for full classical propositional logic, intelim trees still have
an exponential speed-up on Smullyan’s semantic tableaux and on cut-free sequent
proofs even when we consider only intelim proofs and refutations with the SFP.
5 Conclusions and further work
The relations k and k provide an inﬁnite sequence of tractable depth-bounded ap-
proximations to classical propositional logic. The method of intelim trees combines
21However, this presentation of classical logic allows also for representing proofs that do not have the
subformula property simply by removing the restriction to subformulae in the applications of the rule PB.
On the connection between the rule PB and the cut rule of Gentzen’s sequent calculus, as well as on the
advantages of cut-based formalizations of classical logic, see [14,15].
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1 T A → B
2 F ¬A ∧ C
3 T (B ∨D) → (E → H)
4 T (B ∨D) → (¬H → E)
5 T ¬(C ∧D) → (G → H)
6 T ¬C → (¬G → (A ∨ C))
T A
T B
T B ∨D
T E → H
T ¬H → E
T E
T H
 
F E
F ¬H
T H
 
F A
T ¬A
F C
F C ∧D
T ¬(C ∧D)
T G → H
T ¬C
T ¬G → (A ∨ C)
T G
T H
 
F G
T ¬G
T A ∨ C
T C
×
Fig. 1. An intelim proof of depth 2.
features of Natural Deduction (it is based on introduction and elimination rules that
satisfy a form of the inversion principle [16]) and of Smullyan’s Semantic Tableaux
(it is a tree method with no discharge rules 22 that can be used as a refutation
system), but is essentially more eﬃcient than both. It appears to be heuristically
interesting for further developments in a variety of areas. Possible topics of future
research include:
• providing alternative characterizations of classes of inferences whose validity can
(or cannot) be shown at a given depth k;
22The role played by the discharge rules in Gentzen-style natural deduction is played here by the structural
rule PB, which is the only branching rule.
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• extending the notions of depth-bounded consequence and depth-bounded incon-
sistency to non-classical logics by relativizing the primary semantic notions of
informational truth and informational falsity to points of some structured space
(e.g., possible worlds, information states, etc., equipped with an accessibility re-
lation); 23
• investigating depth-bounded approximations for the logics of formal inconsistency
[11] and, more in general, for paraconsistent logics [35];
• exploring the connections between depth-bounded consequence and the polyno-
mial ring calculus [10,12].
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